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“A

s Afghanistan is so clearly demonstrating, one reconstructs during conflict and stabilization, not after it. Reconstruction is in many
ways the essential process that bridges conflict and stabilization.”1 The necessities of reconstruction have frequently drawn the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) into activities that go well beyond its originally intended mission of providing direct security. Examples include contributing to
security sector reform such as restoring the rule of law or training the national
police and army; delivering essential services such as health care, education,
or food; and supporting the functioning of the Afghan authorities.
Although most military forces would readily agree that they are not
the appropriate actors to be performing nonsecurity-related tasks within the
traditional humanitarian domain, in many areas such as the southern Afghan
provinces of Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan, tenuous security conditions
prevent humanitarian organizations from establishing a presence. In some
instances these organizations are deliberately targeted by insurgent groups
in an effort to prevent them from gaining a foothold or becoming effective
in assisting the local populace.2 In such situations, the debate on specific
domains3 becomes less relevant, and military involvement in nonmilitary
activities is necessary to provide a temporary gap and gain momentum for
reaching the primary military goal: the creation of stability.4
22

Parameters

Based on his deployment as commander of the Australian Reconstruction Task Force in Uruzgan, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Ryan stresses:
Consultation with local officials and other interested parties will be a critical
aspect . . . . It is worth establishing a formal mechanism, involving all stakeholders, to facilitate community and government consultation. This interaction should include regular meetings with officials and local inhabitants to
work out the details of individual projects, ensuring that what will be delivered is what the locals need.5

The issue of participation by local stakeholders in ISAF’s stability
and reconstruction activities will be the main focus of this article. As the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are typically tasked “to cover” reconstruction within ISAF, they form the basis of this analysis.6 Since other
ISAF units are also confronted with local participation, however, their experiences are to a lesser extent included. This article’s objectives are threefold.
First, to explain why participation of local stakeholders is essential for the
overall success of the ISAF mission. Second, to identify the challenges ISAF
encounters in local participation. Third, to formulate measures to improve
future participation.
Local Participation
Reconstruction is a fluid process, where social relations and the meaning of institutions are renegotiated while people carefully probe their room
for maneuver, waiting to see if the conditions of relative peace will hold.7 It
is a process driven by local actors: residents, government employees, organizations, and businesses; reestablishing relations; and reconfiguring hierarchies. Within this context, experts distinguish four related areas of meaning
regarding participation, namely: (1) participation as a right to be involved in
decisionmaking, (2) participation as autonomous action, (3) participation as
a development based on local knowledge, and (4) participation as a transfer
of power.8 These four elements seem to merge in the World Bank’s definition of participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources
which affect them.”9
In reality, the extent to which local stakeholders do influence and
share control over areas that affect them varies between almost none to full
participation, as illustrated in Figure 1, an example of different types of
participation by farmers in an agricultural project.10 From this participation
ladder it becomes clear that not just any type of involvement will meet the
World Bank’s definition.
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More Participation
Farmers are in control.

Farmers jointly manage.

Farmers are consulted.

Farmers are informed.

Farmers are persuaded.

Farmers are excluded or coerced.
Less Participation
Figure 1. Participation Ladder

Apart from ranking the intensity of participatory types of behavior
on a participation ladder, one may also examine local participation by distinguishing the motives underlying that participation. Six motives can be
identified for local stakeholders to participate in their own development,
e.g., reconstruction activities:11
• Local ownership.
• Capacity-building.
• Sustainability.
• Increased security.
• Legitimacy of the local authorities.
• Alignment of local perceptions with those of external drivers.
To explain why participation of local stakeholders is essential to the
overall outcome of the mission, the six motives will be examined within the
context of ISAF’s reconstruction activities. The first motive underlying local
participation is the enhancement of local ownership. Reconstruction initiatives should meet the Afghans’ needs and address the peoples’ problems as
they perceive them.12 Local ownership occurs when the Afghan people view
reconstruction as belonging to them instead of the international community.
As a result, a community invests itself in a project and the citizens will defend, maintain, and expand the project long after the international community has departed. If, on the other hand, what is left behind makes no sense
to a local community, does not meet their needs, or is not felt to belong to
them, the projects will be abandoned as soon as the international community
leaves, whether they are ISAF or humanitarian organizations.
Second, local participation is necessary for capacity-building. This
involves the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to individuals and
24
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institutions so they might acquire the long-term ability to establish effective
policies and deliver competent public services.13 One of capacity-building’s
most important by-products is that the host nation increases its ability to
retain, absorb, and facilitate economic investment, whether from donor assistance or private sources.14
Sustainability, the third motive underlying local participation, refers
to the impact that endures beyond the conclusion of outside activities. It also
encompasses the idea that a nation’s resources are finite and reconstruction
should ensure a balance between economic reconstruction, social reconstruction, and democracy and governance. Based on the sustainability motive, aid
managers are forced to consider whether the technology, institutions, or services they are introducing will have a lasting effect on society.15
Fourth, local participation contributes to an increase in security. Establishing trustful relationships with affected populations can ensure access
to critical security information, thereby increasing the organization’s security.16 Local participation can be a way of gaining access to areas or groups
that would otherwise remain inaccessible to foreign organizations.
Fifth, participation of local authorities in ISAF’s reconstruction activities enhances their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Visible involvement of local authorities increases trust and confidence of Afghans in
their government.
The sixth and final motive underlying local participation is to reduce the perception gap. A study done by the Feinstein International Center
in 2005 identified a major disconnect between how outsiders—such as aid
agencies or the military—and local communities understand the meaning of
peace and security.17 Such disconnects could imply the expectations of the
local stakeholders would not match ISAF’s. Local participation contributes
to aligning mutual expectations, or what General David Petraeus described
in Iraq as managing expectations.18
Challenges and Measures for Improvement
Although the motives underlying local participation are widely acknowledged, seven challenges need to be overcome in the field to facilitate
participation of local stakeholders in ISAF’s reconstruction activities.19 To
address the identified challenges and improve participation of local stakeholders, several measures can be taken. The challenges are listed below,
with commentary on the measures necessary to accomplish them.
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Military Culture and Reconstruction Dynamics
Generically, military cultures attach great value to unity of command
and control, top-down hierarchy, discipline, and accountability.20 The military’s approach to problemsolving is directive and coercive, demonstrating
a can-do mentality that enhances effectiveness in combat. The question remains whether a dominant military culture will enhance effectiveness during
reconstruction processes.
Although reconstruction processes take place in many different contexts and situations,21 Sultan Barakat’s comparative research concluded that
there is a recurrent pattern in the reconstruction processes of using too short
a time horizon, of reducing reconstruction to a technical fix instead of a
process of reordering state-society relations and power, and often leaving
locals out of the equation.22 Existing reconstruction processes are often too
oriented to achieving national-level reconstruction. This orientation runs
the risk of overlooking the localized threats to individual security or the reconstruction effort itself.23 Framing the problem in Afghanistan as a conflict
against the Taliban may, for example, overlook the localized dynamics of
a complex ethnic rivalry compounded by competition over land.24 Localized security needs can vary widely. Whereas national security may dictate
a need for army reform, local women may place greater emphasis on the
development of a reliable police force or the restoration of a credible court
to resolve property disputes.25
Compounding these reconstruction dynamics, from a western perspective, Afghan society and culture appear difficult to understand, a circumstance which would favor a demand-driven approach and emphasizing
local participation to accomplish the reconstruction processes. A new cultural understanding and mindset are required on the part of the international
community, including the military. In his paper on “post-modern challenges
for modern warriors,” Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, Director of the
Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, argues that such a change requires the recognition that “the end-state that matters most is not the military
end-state, but the political one . . . . Operational success is not achieved
primarily by the application of lethal firepower and targeting; and that sufficient resources do not lead inexorably to campaign success.”26 To paraphrase Kiszely, for purposes of this article, “the end-state that matters is
the societal one; operational success in reconstruction is determined and
achieved primarily by stakeholders in afflicted societies.”
To accomplish this cultural shift within the military, specific training and education programs are required. During the initial education of
26
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officers and noncommissioned officers, the differences between military
and civilian actors in humanitarian, stability, and reconstruction missions
should be stressed. Topics to address include organizational differences,
humanitarian imperative, development studies, gender, counterinsurgency,
and participatory approaches. During predeployment preparations, military
members should receive orientation and training on assistance strategies
in their particular areas of responsibility. Several organizations such as the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and
NATO, through the Civil-Military Co-operation Center of Excellence and
the NATO School, offer integrated courses to deploying personnel.
The careful selection of military personnel, a second measure, is
also necessary if one is to accomplish a cultural change. Competencies
should include communication and negotiation skills, creativity, flexibility,
and sensitivity.27
A third measure of developing and adjusting doctrine based on previous experiences is essential. An example of these lessons learned is found
in a manual produced by the US Marine Corps titled Countering Irregular
Threats: A Comprehensive Approach.28 The NATO doctrine on civil-military cooperation (AJP-9), which is currently under revision, should also
include guidelines on local participation.
Expertise within Military Forces
In its handbook for practitioners the Active
����������������������������
Learning Network for
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action states,
������������������
“An understanding of the social sciences and expertise in communication techniques
are essential for the implementation of meaningful participatory approaches,
especially in volatile and dangerous environments.”29 Within ISAF, the level
of expertise on participation strategies differs among military personnel.
Due to mission involvements, levels of international military experience increase dramatically, leading to improved knowledge and outcomes. In
most military training and education programs, however, both predeployment
programs and initial education for officers and noncommissioned officers
largely focus on skills and drills and include reconstruction only to a limited
degree. Therefore, new members of the force often experience a knowledge
gap, as became apparent during the deployment of the Dutch PRT in Baghlan
province. This force largely consisted of personnel of the Royal Dutch Air
Force, and few of them were acquainted with land-based support operations.
Several of the (deputy) mission team commanders had only functioned as
air traffic controllers or Patriot fire-unit commanders. Prior to their deploy-
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ment they engaged in a five-week training course to prepare them for their
“new” jobs; the lack of experience made it very difficult for them to successfully operate in theater. To deal with such issues, the Dutch and Canadians,
as well as a number of other military forces, introduced extensive role-play
exercises that allowed their personnel to become accustomed with the local
environment and stakeholders. These exercises are considered quite beneficial in preparing new participants for future deployments.
A special note is appropriate on the preparation of the Australian Reconstruction Task Force in Uruzgan province. In their domestic operations,
particularly in the Northern Territory, the Australian military engineers frequently are involved with indigenous Aboriginals. In their domestic operations these engineers rely heavily on local participation, and such exposure
benefits them greatly during deployments to locales where cooperation with
area residents is essential.
One way to deal with the limited military expertise regarding participation strategies has been to attach civilians to ISAF units. These include
members of such departments as Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, donor organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development. Compared to the approximately 55,100 ISAF
military members in theater in January 2009, however, the number of civilians is very limited.30
The most commonly used organizational model in US-led PRTs
consists of approximately 100 military personnel and three civilians representing USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture,
in addition to an Afghan Ministry of the Interior police officer.31 The German PRT in Kunduz, currently the largest, consists of some 485 personnel
of which 15 are civilians.32 As for the third example, the Dutch/Australian
Task Force Uruzgan consists of approximately 2,400 personnel; the number
of civilian political and developmental advisers in this task force has gradually increased to 12. Apart from these civilians, a small number of so-called
functional specialists (military reservists) are deployed. These reservists are
deployed for a short term, typically two months. Based on their civilian
expertise, functional specialists are mainly assigned project management
activities, such as irrigation management or installing rule of law. Until the
winter of 2008-2009, the number of functional specialists varied between
two and five.
In their research Hekmat Karzai and Professor Julian Lindley-French
identified two contrasting dilemmas generated by the imbalance between
civilian and military personnel:
28
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First, the over-militarization of the presence on the ground which prevents
the subtle management of necessary and complex change. Contacts with key
tribal elders too often take place within a military context, rather than a development context. When relationships are going well much can indeed be
achieved. However, when Afghans are killed in friendly fire incidents the
collective nature of Afghan society rapidly turns an ISAF uniform from an
emblem of solidarity into a symbol of threat. Second, decisions are taken in
distant capitals that have more to do with western political correctness than
local needs and which lead to projects that the Afghan people regard with at
best disdain and more likely contempt. The most notorious example was the
creation of a $1 million Women’s Park. This was understandably met with
derision by local people and undermined all-important credibility. Still, a box
was ticked in London.33

Addressing the question of expertise on participation strategies within military forces is rather straightforward. A first measure is to include the
topic in the various �����������������������������������������������������������
training and education modules. Second, the ratio of civilian personnel should be increased. Contributing nations need to ensure that
programmed civilian positions within ISAF units are filled and their numbers
steadily increased. Additionally, as the focus of reconstruction efforts shifts
to government capacity-building and security-sector reform, the number and
expertise of civilians provided to ISAF should evolve accordingly.
Motives Underlying Activities
The third challenge to local participation is linked to military motives. Many military respondents have stated that activities to increase the
safety of their own forces were often favored over projects aimed at improving grass-root security for the Afghan population. In Baghlan province, the
Dutch carried out a number of activities for the direct benefit of the community. A considerable number of these activities, however, were conducted in
close proximity to the military compound. This was often referred to as the
“six-mile rule,” describing the tendency to positively influence those communities located within six miles of the compound. Military motives based
on force protection may thus create inequality in addressing the needs of the
population living in a confined area, both quantitatively and qualitatively.34
Many Afghans remain doubtful about ISAF’s intentions, a fact which hinders local participation.
In response to the challenges related to motive, campaign plans and
concepts of operations should be operationalized to more effectively guide
deployed military forces in the execution of their activities. If not already
in existence, measures of effectiveness and end-state objectives should be
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established to assist personnel in determining the duration of their commitment and the focus of their activities.
Second, transition processes should be devised to assist civilian agencies in progressively assuming PRT functions. The PRT Executive Steering
Committee should continue to develop and implement this process. As soon
as the security environment allows, PRTs should shift their emphasis from
quick-impact projects to local capacity-building—that is, “Afghanization.”
Time Perspective
Civilian organizations, especially development groups, often expect
to remain in the area of operations for a period of five to ten years, whereas
military missions are planned on a much shorter timeline. Consequently, civilian and military agencies face synchronization problems, for instance, to
what degree would an organization expect and accept “reasonable” progress
during a particular timeframe.35 Military units have primary responsibility
for providing security. Whenever the security situation deteriorates, reconstruction projects might come to an abrupt halt.36
Most ISAF units rotate their personnel every four to six months,
which many civilians regard as too short a timeframe; as one representative
stated, “As soon as you have learned enough it is time to return home.” Due
to this rapid turnover of military personnel, systematic, long-term monitoring and followup projects are lacking, especially if they do not fall within
the normal range of competency for those involved.37 Short rotations can
be advantageous, as long as they permit enough time to improve the operation while still preventing the military from getting stuck in a “seen-it-all,
done-it-all” attitude. If the new replacements function well, a continuous
improvement of the operation could result. The successful rotation of personnel requires sufficient time, along with the storage and sharing of information and intelligence in ways that make it accessible.38
The time constraints imposed by the limited duration of military deployments has the very real possibility of endangering local participation.39
Participation requires confidence and trust. The amount of time required to
establish relationships depends on individual attitudes and skills, along with
the manner in which ISAF personnel are perceived by the local populace.
Answering the question of “What happens if the military leaves?”40
a number of experts believe the transition to local capacity and management
should be executed at the earliest possible moment.41 According to Garland
Williams, the goal of every reconstruction intervention is to build capacity
and support implementation of local control. The “outside” organizations,
whether they are military or humanitarian, can never lose sight of the fact
30
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A number of successful initiatives have increased
governance in Afghan provinces.

that the purpose of external assistance is to aid the host nation in developing
its own capabilities, along with public and private institutions.
The military perspective related to time clearly implies a need for a
defined end-state42 and an exit strategy43 to prevent any long-term military involvement in the mission, as well as continued civilian dependency on military resources.44 In practice, however, the timeframes are difficult to control.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said that the length of ISAF’s stay would
depend upon “the security situation on the ground, the decisions made by the
Loya Jirga after its convening, and the establishment of a functioning police
force. When these are all achieved and the scourge of terrorism is rooted out
once and for all, only then would their mission be completed.”45
One measure to increase the effectiveness of the time element is
extension of military deployments. Short-duration assignments are counterproductive and should be avoided. For military personnel involved in
reconstruction activities, a tour length of one year should be the minimum
period of service.
Second, at the start of the deployment a robust “hand-over, takeover” is essential to raise awareness and to prevent duplication of previous
activities. Because many personnel, military and civilian alike, regularly
transfer, a hand-over, take-over becomes essential to ensuring continuity.
A “reach-back” function such as an office back-up and the creation of civilmilitary organizations to communicate and share information can contribute
to heightening awareness during deployments.
Third, if at all possible, time should be allocated during the actual deployment, and more importantly during the post-deployment phase,
for personnel to record lessons learned. Lessons learned in any operation
should not only be put to practice the next time around, but should also
be widely disseminated. Such actions are not just about recording lessons
learned, however; the challenge is to make certain the trove of experience
is utilized in future missions and integrated into all phases of training and
exercises. Often, the most direct and best way to accomplish this is to gather
individuals from the various sectors and exchange experiences.
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Governance
The fifth challenge to local participation in Afghanistan is the vulnerability of governance in a number of the provinces. Good governance is
a prerequisite for the development and maintenance of security, stability,
and economic recovery. While the central government holds extensive constitutional authority over the provinces, Kabul’s limited ability to intervene
and its accommodation of power brokers have left factional chiefs in control of local governments.46
In areas where the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) program was implemented and warlords were disarmed, ISAF units
have been hiring these same warlords as private contractors. Ever since,
the warlords have been gaining strength with the assistance of international
funding, consolidating their power, and dominating the local populace. Such
events illustrate a major pitfall related to local participation. If, and when,
the backgrounds of local stakeholders are not verified, their participation
can elicit unintended negative outcomes, such as bolstering the status of
local power brokers.
Apart from the questionable backgrounds of a number of civil servants, there are other reasons for insufficient governance. They include, but
are not limited to, the mimimal level of education on the part of Afghanistan’s civil servants, the lack of proper wages, an absence of accountability
systems, and the illicit narcotics trade. The lack of good governance is noted
in a 2007 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which
states that “roughly 52 percent of men and 26 percent of women feel that
they do not have a voice in reconstruction efforts. In interviews most Afghans corroborate that the central government is not listening or responding
to their needs or demands. Civil society, business associations, and traditional elders are slowly becoming more organized and effective at lobbying
the government.”47
To address this issue, the most effective PRTs work in close collaboration with provincial and community institutions to plan and implement activities.48 These organizations permit local officials to serve as the focal point
for project initiation, discussion, and approval. Germany has established a
Provincial Development Fund from which local Afghan communities, often
acting through Community Development Councils (CDCs), can apply for
financial assistance for projects. The proposals are then jointly evaluated by
an eight-member committee comprised of provincial-level officials and one
representative from each of the four German ministries represented in the
PRT. These collaborative relationships have been effective at linking com32
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munities with provincial structures, building the capacity and legitimacy of
provincial governments and CDCs, and reinforcing existing initiatives such
as the National Solidarity Program.49
There have been a number of successful initiatives that have increased
governance in various provinces. To optimize the added value of local stakeholders in reconstruction activities and minimize negative effects (corruption), it is necessary for military units and personnel to be aware of the background of the various stakeholders. A key-leader engagement plan, which is
currently being utilized in a number of Afghan provinces, can ensure greater
clarity. A second measure is based on the ability of Afghan government entities to exercise greater responsibility for coordination of assistance. This
program has already been instituted by some provincial governors. Finally,
it is important to build capacity. To accomplish this, the training and education of Afghan civil servants need to improve. The assignment of liaison
personnel from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and the National Police,
for example, can enhance the Afghan government’s ownership of programs
and the local capacity to govern successfully, while promoting the principle
of civilian control over the military. PRTs should never be viewed as replacing the link between national and local government.
Gender Sensitivity and Inclusion
Research indicates that women and men perceive conflict—and the
associated coping mechanisms—in different ways.50 This distinction poses
important challenges to actors dealing with conflict-affected societies. Gender sensitivity typically will benefit understanding of the local environment.
Based on increased gender sensitivity, military personnel can strengthen
their relations with local populations, enhance their ability to respond to
specific security needs, bolster planned responses, and further their role in
upholding international standards and human rights.51 This approach is a
matter of engaging women as well as men in the process of conflict resolution, rebuilding institutions and societies, and achieving sustainable peace.52
Promoting good governance means ensuring women are voting and running
for office; judicial reform means aligning legislation and procedures with international standards for women’s rights; preventing conflict means engaging the commitment of men in cultures where masculinity is associated with
aggression; and successful DDR also means addressing the specific challenges of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating female combatants.53
Gender analyses related to conflict and human security, as well as a
gender-balanced representation of peacekeepers, are essential components
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in a bias-free perspective on reconstruction.54 Many strategy documents
have included references to gender following the rise to power of the Afghan
transitional government in early 2002. Local knowledge and ownership of
these strategies, on the other hand, are limited, mainly because they were
developed by international consultants and never translated into Afghan
languages or dialects. Moreover, a number of the objectives of these documents reflect a western perspective related to gender equality, a perspective
almost certain to clash with Afghan values, particularly those prescribed by
Islam.55 In Afghanistan, “anytime you need to do something for women,”
the head of an international organization explained, “it was all about handicrafts and tailoring . . . . In a way it reinforced the social construction of
women’s roles . . . as if there is no other thing that women can do.”56 The
market in Kabul is saturated with female tailors unable to find employment.
Gender continues to be viewed as a “women’s issue,” and advice from experts to the effect that in Afghan society it is essential to include men in any
gender development effort has largely gone unheeded.57
With regard to a gender-balanced representation among peacekeepers, a more equitable gender ratio based on an increased number of female
civilians, police, and military peacekeepers is likely to have a positive influence on peace support operations.58 This result is mainly due to the fact
that women possess much-needed knowledge and capabilities, essential in
communicating with local communities and leaders.59 Local citizens, especially women, appear to be more comfortable approaching female military
members, especially regarding issues of assault, domestic violence, or requests for assistance.60
Before addressing the needs of specific groups, it is important for
military units to understand these groups and their role in local society. To
facilitate interaction with female stakeholders in the local area it is necessary
for military units to increase the number of female members at every rank.
A similar approach is currently under way to involve more Muslim military
in ISAF units. These changes in gender, ethnic, and religious participants
are specifically used to bridge the cultural gap and improve understanding
of local stakeholders.61
Civilian Attitudes toward ISAF
The final challenge refers to the civilian attitudes toward ISAF and
how they apply to local Afghan actors as well as to members of humanitarian organizations, both Afghan and international. As the Afghan co-authors
point out, it is dangerous for local Afghans to be seen talking to or exchanging information with ISAF forces. There are numerous examples of villag34
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ers being threatened, injured, or even killed following any interaction with
foreign forces. This risk clearly has a negative impact on the willingness of
local Afghans to participate in ISAF activities. Compounding this fear, the
anti-poppy rhetoric of western leaders is not popular with the local farmers
or with the warlords and their political supporters who profit from cultivation of poppies.62 Alternative programs for the poppy farmers have been difficult to institute and, so far, none of these programs have proven as lucrative as opium production. Again, this has a negative influence on the local
attitude toward ISAF and their willingness to participate in its programs.
With regard to interaction with ISAF at the operational level, international humanitarian organizations generally regard humanitarian principles
as strict guidelines governing conduct of their programs. These guidelines
have been codified in a policy brief by the Agency
�����������������������������
Coordinating Body for
Afghan Relief,��������������������������������������������������������������
stating that if ISAF is working in close cooperation with or
proximity to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local power brokers
and militants will no longer be able to distinguish between military programs and civilian-implemented assistance.63 At the operational level, not
only will such activities blur the roles of organizations, they can also have
a negative impact on the relationship between NGOs and the local communities. The real fear is that this blurring of roles may pose security risks to
humanitarian organizations if they are perceived as collaborating with the
military or channeling intelligence to it.
At the tactical level, these humanitarian principles are considered
critical to governing the humanitarian organizations’ conduct. At the same
time, members of these organizations are often forced to take a more pragmatic approach, and depending on various motivations, they will have to
interact with ISAF. These motives are normally part of the complementary
coping capacity ISAF can provide, such as ISAF’s assessment capacity, financial resources, technical knowledge, and the direct or indirect security
military forces can provide.
Author Antonio Donini asks whether the blurring of roles really
matters to Afghans at the grass-roots level.64 Does it matter if assistance
comes in a military truck or under the auspices of an NGO? Based on several studies Donini concludes that the answer is “no.” What seems to be
important is “what” is provided, not “who” provides it. These conclusions
are consistent with a Dutch study commissioned by the Cordaid relief group
that questioned whether, at the local level, the Afghan people actually distinguish between who provides assistance.65
Our co-authors Khalil and Wahidi believe the Afghan NGOs are
pragmatic regarding working with the military. Additionally, they believe
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there is a feeling among a number of indigenous NGOs that they are being
used as cheap laborers to implement programs by the larger international
NGOs. Local agencies feel excluded from the decisionmaking processes.
Accordingly, the co-authors believe: “This is a severe mistake as indigenous NGOs are close to the local people and they are aware of the local
society, its structures, and relationships because they have been part of these
societies all their lives.” The Cordaid study reinforced the co-authors’ beliefs with findings regarding “a rift” that has emerged between local NGOs
and international agencies on how closely military and civilian organizations should associate.
Some of the local agencies denounce the principled stance of international
NGOs . . . while ignoring the massive needs on the ground. Most communities
long for security and are eager to receive assistance. Humanitarian principles
and the maintenance of distinctions between military and development interventions are not at the top of people’s lists.66

Military forces need to be extremely cautious when interacting with
local stakeholders and national and international humanitarian organizations in public. Isolated locations, removed from public scrutiny, such as
PRT headquarters or chai/tea houses, should be utilized for meetings or individual contact. Another equally important measure is the guideline that
no reconstruction activities should be implemented without significant involvement on the part of local organizations.
Conclusion
In the 1990s, reconstruction activities were believed to have too much
of an influence over the unrelenting push for the introduction of democratic
government.67 Since then, reconstruction strategies have shifted to a more
balanced institutional approach aimed at simultaneously advancing recovery in governance, security, justice and reconciliation, and socio-economic
development. Establishing successful programs for integrated reconstruction is not an easy task, especially when peace and security are achievable
at the beginning of the process but are meant to be the outcome or objective
of the reconstruction process. This is certainly the case in Afghanistan. Successful reconstruction requires excellent relationships between diplomatic,
developmental, and military actors and programs.
Overlooking localized dynamics in reconstruction activities could
lead to a failure of knowledge of the forces that originally created the requirement for peace. The majority of conflicts concluded in the past decade did so
by means of a negotiated settlement, not military victory. Another fact often
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ignored is that in a number of cases the local people who helped to forge the
peace felt excluded from the associated reconstruction processes. This lack
of understanding on the part of outside agencies and governments often leads
to the underestimation of local resources available for reconstruction. Many
ISAF units use the slogan “Put an Afghan face on everything” to indicate the
need to involve local stakeholders, thereby advancing the credibility of local
authorities. Although this is an encouraging sign it often only establishes
credibility for a short time and never fully equates to total participation on
the part of the locals. The authors have emphasized that participation implies
more than an Afghan face; it requires total involvement on the part of Afghan stakeholders throughout the entire reconstruction process, not simply
in marketing the final product. Such total participation, however, requires
time to develop, or as several local observers commented, “An Afghan face
equals an Afghan pace.”
It is only recently that a trend has emerged related to the development of localized reconstruction programs.68 According to Professor Thea
Hilhorst, the longtime lack of attention regarding localized reconstruction
is partly related to the assumption that societies stop functioning during a
crisis or become totally immersed in the logic of conflict. Those responsible
for the conduct of research into the underlying tenets of reconstruction and
local participation would do well to heed such assumptions regarding crisis
and conflict.
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